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Abstract
We study how identity politics determines clientelism and provision of public goods in
representative democracies. Parties cultivate vote banks — a group of voters who vote along
identity lines — in exchange for clientelistic transfers, and provide public goods to non-
partisan voters. There is ex-post identity formation among non-partisans that depends on
the party in power. This generates an asymmetry in ex-post conflict payoff for the majority
identity. The main theoretical result proposes a new mechanism for clientelism and rent
seeking that is driven by identity politics. We further show that asymmetry in identity
payoffs i) increases investment in conflict when the party with the support of minorities
wins; and ii) increases public goods provision by both parties when income of minorities
is below a threshold. We provide empirical evidence from state level elections in India for
the period from 1983 till 2000. Results show that identity conflict is more intense when the
party with minority identity vote bank is in power. This effect is magnified by the income
of minorities. Further, provision of public goods under the party with minority vote bank
increases with asymmetry in identity payoffs.
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1 Introduction
Social identities play a key role in shaping political processes in representative democracies.
Often, political parties have an incentive to exploit identity fault lines to serve their political
interests. For example, right-wing parties have reaped electoral benefits by propagating a
majoritarian identity that is rooted in a sense of nativism or nationalism.1 Left-wing parties,
on the other hand, have counteracted this by championing the interests of minority groups.2
This partisanship leads to vote banks — voters with an underlying social identity support
parties based on an identity preference, in return for clientelistic transfers (e.g., Banerjee and
Pande, 2007; Issacharoff, 1992). Meanwhile, identity preferences push society towards inter-
group conflict and redistribution of resources (e.g., Esteban and Ray, 1994; Esteban and Ray,
2008; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013). Identity based voting and conflict are therefore key features
of identity politics.
While existing research on political competition has isolated the effects of identity based
preferences (Besley and Persson, 2019) and inter-group conflict (Wilkinson, 2006), the interplay
between electoral competition, identity politics, and redistribution of resources has not been
studied in the literature. In this paper, we develop a model of electoral competition with an
ex-post possibility of identity conflict and redistribution. We find that when identity politics
is more salient, i) parties appropriate higher rents and reduce clientalistic transfers to their
vote banks; and ii) under certain conditions, parties increase public goods provision towards
the non-partisan electorate.
Setup. We consider political competition between two office motivated parties A and
B. The electorate is divided into three groups. Two of the groups belong to the “majority”
social identity and the other group is the “minority”. Out of the two groups that belong to
the majority, one of them consists of non-partisan voters who ex ante do not vote along party
lines. The two remaining groups are vote banks: they are each affiliated with a political party
— minority group with A and majority group with B — and vote en masse for that party.
Political platforms of parties consists of a clientelistic transfer to their respective vote bank
and a public goods platform to non-partisan voters.
After elections, there is a possibility of identity conflict between majority and minority
groups. Conflict results in redistribution of income away from minorities (Mitra and Ray,
1The re-emergence of majoritarian identities in democratic polities has been well documented. For example,
in the U.S., Republican and Democratic party voters have become more ideologically divided in the last two
decades (see, e.g., “The demographic trends shaping American politics in 2016 and beyond” by Pew Research
Center). A similar tendency of polarization and majoritarian politics has been observed in India and Turkey,
among other democracies.
2The type of identity politics practiced by left leaning parties has been described as “identity liberalism”.
For example, Some political commentators have suggested that Hillary Clinton’s excessive focus on African-
American, Latino, L.G.B.T. and women voters on the campaign trail alienated the white voters and therefore
resulted in a failed presidential bid. See “The End of Identity Liberalism”, New York Times (November 18,
2016).
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2014). Crucially, there is a difference between the two parties in the probability with which
identity is triggered among non-partisans (henceforth, we refer to this difference as polariza-
tion).3 Further, minorities face an institutional bias (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014; Knox
et al., 2019) that makes their engagement in conflict costly, irrespective of the party in power.
Theoretical Results. We characterize equilibrium protection rents and identity rents4 to
parties A and B respectively. Specifically, we show that rents to parties increases as polar-
ization between them widens. The intuition is that higher polarization implies an additional
conflict payoff to the majority identity when B wins. This increases the asymmetry in ex-post
payoff to the majority vote bank. The minority vote bank seeks protection from higher polar-
ization by accepting lesser clientelistic transfers. This decreases the ex-ante bargaining power
of both vote banks resulting in higher rents in equilibrium.5
We next show that clientelism increases the equilibrium ex-post investment in conflict by
the groups. Specifically, investment in conflict is higher when party A wins, and increasing in
the size of transfers to the minority vote bank. Since minorities have greater resources when
A wins, there is higher investment in protection. Given complementarities in the conflict
process,6 majority identity groups also increase investment to appropriate resources from the
minorities.
Finally, an increase in polarization or institutional bias may have the opposite effect on
public goods provision by parties. Specifically, an increase in polarization puts pressure on
party A to compensate non-partisans for the increased expected conflict payoff under party
B. This leads to an increase in public goods provision in equilibrium. Clientelism and public
goods provision are therefore substitutes in the case of A. In the case of party B, we find that
public goods provision increases only when minority income falls below a threshold. This
implies that when minorities are poor, the additional conflict income that accrues to non-
partisans from greater polarization is insufficient. This incentivizes party B to promise more
public goods in equilibrium. In contrast, when the income of minorities is above a certain
threshold, the expected conflict payoff to non-partisans from electing party B effectively sub-
stitutes for public goods provision. This leads to a decrease in public goods provision by party
B in equilibrium.
Empirical Findings. We substantiate our findings through evidence from India, where
religious identity based cleavages have driven electoral politics in the past four decades. The
main right leaning party, the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) has cultivated upper caste Hindus as
its traditional voter base. The main left leaning party, the Indian National Congress (Congress)
3Without loss of generality, we assume a higher likelihood of ex-post identity conflict when party B wins.
4We interpret rents as what accrues to parties after providing clientelistic transfers to their vote banks.
5A similar effect is at play when institutional biases against minorities increases. An increase in biases
exacerbate the imbalance in bargaining power and results in an increase in rents to the parties.
6The conflict process is modeled as a contest game between the majority groups and minorities. This generates
investments in conflict that are strategic complements (see, e.g., Corcho´n, 2007)
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has cultivated minority Muslims as its voter base. Using geo-referened data that covers 96% of
India and spans a period from 1983 and 2000, we investigate how party rule and institutional
bias determine Hindu-Muslim conflict and provision of public goods.
Our first set of results pertain to party rule and conflict intensity. Results show that riots are
more intense when Congress is in power. The point estimate suggests that a Congress ruled
district experiences 0.14 additional days of rioting compared to a non-Congress ruled district
(relative to sample average of 0.24 days of rioting). We further investigate the mechanism and
find that riot duration under Congress rule is magnified by the size of economic resources that
Muslims possess. A simple counterfactual analysis suggests if Muslim per capita expenditure
rose from 25th percentile to 75th percentile of the sample, the effect of Congress rule on riot
duration will increase by 78%.
Next, we investigate the relationship between party rule, polarization or institutional bias,
and provision of public goods. Our theory predicts that both polarization and institutional
bias have similar mediating effect on the type of party in power and provision of public goods.
We use provision of electricity in districts as a proxy for public goods provision by parties.
The empirical challenge however is to find suitable measures of polarization or institutional
bias. While we do not have a proxy to measure polarization, we proxy institutional bias using
the distance of a district to the nearest medieval port. This is based on evidence that me-
dieval ports in India continue to have higher inter-ethnic complementarity and lower conflict
between Hindus and Muslims due to local institutions that developed as a consequence of
medieval trade (Jha, 2013).
We find that provision of electricity under Congress rule increases with institutional bias
against Muslims. The point estimate suggests that 10% increase in distance to medieval port
increases electricity provision under Congress rule by 16%. The relationship between insti-
tutional bias and provision of electricity under BJP rule is more complex. The provision of
electricity under BJP rule declines with distance to medieval port. Specifically, 10% increase
in distance to medieval port decreases electricity provision under BJP by 9%. However, in
districts where Muslims are very poor, the provision of electricity under BJP rule increases
with institutional bias.
Contribution. The paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on clien-
telism and rent seeking, identity conflict, and political competition. Besley and Persson (2019)
consider a dynamic setup with multi-dimensional political competition in the presence of so-
cial identities. We instead focus on the interplay between clientelism and conflict brought on
by identity politics in a political competition framework.
Our theoretical finding presents a new mechanism for clientelism to emerge in electoral
politics. The existing literature focuses on primarily three channels of clientelism: i) monetary
transfers (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2012); ii) employment (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Robinson
and Verdier, 2013); and iii) contracts (Lehne et al., 2018). In contrast, clientelism in our model
4
is driven by vote bank politics and is intertwined with social identity. In the same vein, there
is extensive empirical research on rent seeking by politicians (see, e.g., Avis et al., 2018; Ferraz
and Finan, 2011; Fisman et al., 2014). In our setup protection rents and identity rents to parties
are driven by identity polarization and ex-post conflict between groups.
We also contribute to the theoretical literature on inter-group conflict based on social iden-
tity (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Esteban and Ray, 1999). The crucial difference is that ex-post
conflict affects ex-ante political platforms of parties. In the context of Indian politics, this in-
teraction between elections and inter-group conflict has been studied extensively (Wilkinson,
2006; Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018; Ticku, 2015).7 The seminal work of Mitra and Ray (2014)
shows that Hindu-Muslim group conflict redistributes income away from minority Muslims
whenever their incomes increase due to a shock.8 They are, however, agnostic on the reasons
for this income shock. We present a mechanism for this income shock to minorities. Our
paper therefore complements Mitra and Ray (2014): we propose a clientelistic rationale and
provide empirical evidence for an increase in intensity of conflict with minority income.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature that analyzes inefficiencies related to identity
politics. For example, Bardhan et al. (2018) show that greater clientelism pushes parties to-
wards lower public goods provision in equilibrium. Acharya et al. (2015) show how group
bias — in particular, caste bias — towards a political party decreases public goods provision
by the party when it wins power.9 In contrast, we show that greater polarization can reduce
clientelism towards vote banks. Simultaneously, we also find that clientelism can result in
higher provision of public goods to the non-partisan voters.
2 Model
Parties, Group identities, and Vote banks. Two parties {A, B} compete to win an election
by seeking support from a population of voters. Voters are divided into three groups indexed
by Gi, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Citizens belonging to the group G1 are part of the minority identity
while voters in groups {G2, G3} belong to the majority identity.10 We assume that parties
have cultivated (exogenous) vote banks among the voting groups. Party A’s vote bank is
7Wilkinson (2006) finds that riots are more likely in districts that are electorally more competitive. Iyer and
Shrivastava (2018) and Ticku (2015) show that riots significantly increase Bharatiya Janta Party’s vote share in
subsequent elections. Together these papers indicate that electoral competition can incentivize political leaders
to foment Hindu-Muslim conflict.
8In contrast, the work by Jha (2013) and Jha (2014) show that inter-group violence is affected by historical
legacies. He shows that conflict decreases in areas with historical economic interdependence between Hindu-
Muslim communities.
9In a related work, Banerjee and Pande (2007) find evidence for a drop in quality of politicians due to identity
based voting.
10For example, in the case of US, the groups {2, 3} would be White American voters and group {1} could be
the African American voters.
5
the minority identity group G1 and party B’s vote bank is the majority identity G2. Voters
belonging to G3 are non-partisan and not affiliated with either party ex ante, which allows
them to vote for either of the two parties in the electoral competition process.11
The population share of each group is assumed to be exogenous and given by ni. We make
the following assumptions on group sizes: i) ni < 12 for groups (G1, G2); ii) n3 > {n1, n2}.
The first assumption implies that parties have to rely on the support of non-partisan voters
in G3. The second assumption ensures that non-partisan group has the largest share of voters
in the populace. Let the population ratios of the groups be defined in the following manner:
r23 = n2n3 and r13 =
n1
n3
.
Party platforms. There is a payoff T (benefits of office) that each party has access to if
it gets elected to power. Each party bargains with their respective vote banks —(A, G1) and
(B, G2)—on the amount of clientelistic transfer if they get elected to office. The transfers from
bargaining to G1 and G2 are denoted by T1 and T2 respectively.12 Transfers to vote banks
could be, for example, awarding of government contracts or providing subsidies that facilitate
religious activities. The rents from office to parties A and B is therefore (T− T1) and (T− T2)
respectively. The parties compete for the votes of non-partisan G3 group voters by announcing
a public good T j3, where j ∈ {A, B}. That is, we assume that non-partisan voters care about
policies that enhance social welfare.13 The political platforms of the parties are given by a pair
of promises (T1, TA3 ) and (T2, T
B
3 ) respectively.
Conflict. An important element of the political process is that parties can trigger ex-
post conflict between the majority and minority identity groups. Contingent on the winning
party, an environment for anti-minority sentiment is triggered among the majority populace.
Specifically, a majority identity is formed with probability θA or θB depending on whether
party A or B wins, respectively. We assume that this trigger in identity happens with a
greater probability when the right-wing party B wins the election, implying θB > θA. When
the identities are triggered, there is conflict between the minorities {G1} and the majority
groups {G2, G3}. The majority identity engages in conflict as a single entity. If G1 loses the
conflict, a proportion δ of their wealth is redistributed away (uniformly) towards the majority
groups G2 and G3.14
Conflict resources. Each individual belonging to a group g ∈ {1, 23} expends resources
11We assume all non-partisans belong to the majority identity. This does not alter the analysis of the paper as
long as minority non-partisans are unaffected by the identity and conflict process. This merely rescales the effort
decisions of the non-partisan majority voters.
12The precise bargaining procedure is described in detail in Section 3.
13Alternatively, we can assume that non-partisan voters care about candidate competence or valence, which
they gauge through the size of promised public good. T j3 could also be an investment in valence that candidates
make that provides a positive benefit to non-partisan voters (see, e.g., Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009)
and Banerjee and Pande (2007)).
14We abstract away from the distributional aspects of the problem and instead focus on symmetric within
group contributions to conflict and uniform redistribution of conflict gains.
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ajg (endogenously determined) towards the conflict in case identity is triggered when party
j ∈ {A, B} is in power. Let aj = (aj1, aj23) be the vector of resource investments by individuals
belonging to the minority and majority identities respectively. q(aj) represents the probability
with which there is redistribution of resources away from the minorities when party j gets
elected to power. The conflict payoff to a voter belonging to group i ∈ {1, 2, 3} when party j
wins the election is vi(aj) ≡ vji .
Payoffs. A party, conditional on winning office, receives a payoff equal to the residual
rents from bargaining and provisioning a costly public good to the non-partisan group.
UA = (T − T1 − TA3 ) UB = (T − T2 − TB3 )
The payoff to voters depends on both the political platforms and the post-electoral conflict
outcome. Without loss of generality, the aggregate initial income of the majority identity
groups (G2, G3) is normalized to zero and that of the minority group is assumed to be Y1 =
n1 · y1, where y1 is the per capita income of an individual belonging to the minorities. Since
minority group voters receives additional bargaining rents only when party A wins, we will
refer to their group incomes under the two regimes as YA1 = Y1 + T1 and Y
B
1 = Y1. The voters
in groups G1 and G2 are homogeneous in their payoffs.
Payoff to G1 voter:
U1 =
{
Y1+T1
n1
+ vA1 if A wins
Y1
n1
+ vB2 if B wins
Payoff to G2 voter:
U2 =
{
vA2 if A wins
T2
n2
+ vB2 if B wins
Payoff to a non-partisan voter i ∈ G3 is,
UAi =
TA3
n3
+ vA3 (1)
UBi =
TB3
n3
+ vB3 + µ+ ei (2)
The preferences of non-partisans are subject to random shocks (µ, ei) as in the probabilistic
voting literature.15 ei is the idiosyncratic individual shock to voter i and µ is the aggregate
shock. In order to get closed form solutions, we assume that both shocks are uniformly dis-
tributed on [−12 , 12 ]. The interpretation is that a positive shock implies a shift in preference
favorable to party B, and vice-versa for a negative shock. The parameters (T, y1, ni, θj) are all
common knowledge. We make the following assumption on the parameters to ensure interior
15See Persson and Tabellini (2002).
7
solutions.
Assumption 1. Y1 ≤ 1, TY1 ≤ 2∆θθA
The second inequality implies that the ratio of office rents to income of minorities is
bounded from above. The upper bound is further decreasing in θA. The condition ensures the
transfers from bargaining process is positive and the equilibrium platforms are well defined.
Timing. The electoral competition game with ex-post identity induced conflict proceeds
as follows.
1. The parties simultaneously announce platforms: (T1, TA3 ) by A and (T2, T
B
3 ) by B.
2. The aggregate and idiosyncratic preference shocks, (µ, ei) ∼ U[−12 , 12 ], are realized and
observed by the voters.
3. G3 group voters choose between A and B; the winning party implements its platform.
4. The identity environment is triggered with probability θw under the winning party w ∈
{A, B}. If identity is triggered, the groups choose conflict resources aw and redistribu-
tion of resources happen with probability q(aw).
5. Payoffs are realized.
Discussion of the setup
The setup of the model relies on three premises. First, there are two exogenous vote banks, each
supporting one of the parties. Second, parties implicitly bargain with the vote banks instead of
competing for their votes and their is uncertainty in non-partisan voter’s preferences. Third,
there is ex-ante polarization in the probability of identity trigger that leads to ex-post inter-
group conflict.
Vote banks. There is anecdotal and empirical evidence for the existence of such vote
banks in the Indian political landscape. For example, Muslim voters in India have traditionally
been viewed as a vote bank of the center-left Congress party (Nellis et al., 2016) while the
upper-caste Hindus have sided with the RSS ideology (Jaffrelot, 1999), the political version of
which is the BJP party.16 Analogously, in the US, a study conducted by Pew Research Center17
found that 92% of Republicans were to the right of a median Democrat in their core social,
economic and political views, while close to 94% of Democrats were to the left of a median
16The RSS which is the ideological cornerstone of the right wing politics in India, is known for its nationalist
stance and the creation of a nation based on an unified Hindu identity. It is also the primary grass roots
organization whose members actively participate and contribute to political campaigns of BJP party.
17For a more detailed analysis, see article titled “The demographic trends shaping American politics in 2016
and beyond” (January 27, 2016).
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Republican. Iyengar et al. (2019) document this form of affective polarization among Republican
and Democratic party supporters.
Bargaining. The bargaining process is a form of cultivated clientelism by the parties. Clien-
telistic transfers to these vote banks could take the form of direct discriminatory spending
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2012), providing public sector jobs (Calvo and Murillo, 2004), or
awarding government contracts (Lehne et al., 2018) that benefit members of the vote bank. Ad-
ditionally, the transfer could be identity reinforcing spending on groups or a direct transfer
to religious leaders in exchange for buying their community’s support.18 Similarly, a transfer
to the majority vote bank could either indirectly reinforce majoritarian identity (e.g., building
religious institutions, spending to promote majoritarian cultural practices, rewriting academic
curricula to suit identity preferences), or provide direct pecuniary benefits in the form of
government jobs and other favorable contracts (see, e.g., Lehne et al. (2018)).
Voting with uncertain preferences. We model candidates’ uncertainty about voter’s
preferences in a manner similar to Bernhardt et al. (2007) and Groseclose (2001). The shocks
could be interpreted in two possible ways. First, this could be a valence shock in favor of B
—and in favor of A when the shock is negative —during the course of a political campaign
(e.g., Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009)). Second, the shocks may emerge from negative
advertising which is a common feature of electoral campaigns. It is not uncommon in elec-
tions, for example, to have scandals revealed about political candidates during the campaign
process.
Identity trigger and conflict. The mechanism of our conflict process is similar to the one
described in Mitra and Ray (2014). The main departure of our model is that we assume ex ante
polarization between parties in creating an environment for conflict. For example, Nellis et al.
(2016) find that electoral victory of center-left Congress party reduces the incidence of Hindu-
Muslim riots. Further, they argue that the main reason for this was an electoral incentive, in
that the Congress party relied heavily on Muslim votes. We further assume that θA ≥ 0. This
is consistent with the observation of Wilkinson (2006) that riots also occur under Congress
regimes, except with lesser frequency compared to when BJP is in power.19
18In India, for example, Muslims were granted Haj subsidies that provided compensation for Muslim families
to travel to Mecca for the Haj pilgrimage. The Haj subsidy in 2007 was close to $100 million and was the largest
expenditure by the Central government for “Muslim welfare” (Frontline, 2007).
19He writes, “despite Congress’s official claims to always protect minorities, the party’s status as the dominant
catchall party for many years and its often weak party discipline has meant that at one time or another Congress
politicians have both fomented and prevented communal violence for political advantage.”
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3 Main Results
Conflict
The ex-post conflict payoff to a voter in the majority groups when either party wins the
election is given by,
vAi = θA
[
q(aA).
δ(Y1 + T1)
(n2 + n3)
− aA23
]
, i ∈ {2, 3} (3)
vBi = θB
[
q(aB).
δY1
(n2 + n3)
− aB23
]
, i ∈ {2, 3} (4)
The conflict payoff relies on the exogenous probability of identity formation θj and the en-
dogenous probability of redistribution away from the minorities, q(aj). There is a sunk cost
of fighting that individuals choose strategically. Similarly, the conflict payoff to the minority
identity voter is given by,
vA1 =
(Y1 + T1)
n1
− θA
[
q(aA).
δ(Y1 + T1)
n1
+ KaA1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
conflict cost under party A
(5)
vB1 =
Y1
n1
− θB
[
q(aB).
δY1
n1
+ KaB1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
conflict cost under party B
(6)
where q(aj) =
(1− n1)aj23
n1.a
j
1 + (1− n1).aj23
Minorities face a higher marginal cost K > 1 of defending. K captures the bias in in-
stitutions like the police and legal system (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014) against
minorities.20 Since we are interested in symmetric within-group investment, the aggregate
investment by a group is determined by the relative population shares of each group, akin to
the models of ethnic conflict by Esteban and Ray (1999) and Esteban and Ray (2008).21
For the majority identity, the problem is one of choosing resources in order to maximize
their win-probability q(aj). The minorities aim is to minimize this probability. The follow-
ing equality captures the relationship between population shares and investment in conflict
resources,
1− n1
n1
.
aj23
aj1
= K (7)
20Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) find evidence of racial bias in capital sentencing against African Americans in
the United States.
21Also see Corcho´n (2007).
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Lemma 1. The probability of redistribution is independent of the party in power and is given by,
q(aj) =
K
1+ K
≡ q
Not surprisingly, the probability of redistribution is increasing in the extent of bias K.
From an ex-ante perspective this is intuitive since our setup induces a difference only in
the exogenous probability with which the identities are shaped under the two parties. But
once the population is divided along majority-minority identity lines, the strategic problem
of investing in conflict resources is the same irrespective of the party in power.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium investment in conflict resources when party j wins is given by,
aj1 =
1
(1+ K)2
(
δY j1
n1
)
aj23 =
K
(1+ K)2
.
(
δY j1
n2 + n3
)
Equilibrium investment in conflict is proportional to the income of the minority group,
i.e. aj1, a
j
23 ∝ Y
j
1. The intuition is the following. When minorities receive a transfer and have
higher expendable incomes as a consequence of clientelism, conflict offers a greater reward
for members of the majority identity. Given conflict is a zero sum game and there are strategic
complementarities in effort, any increase in the marginal gains from conflict —through higher
transfers—to minorities results in greater effort provision by the majority identity groups.
Correspondingly, a greater bias reduces investment in conflict since it makes effort provision
relatively costlier for the minorities.
Equilibrium Platform Selection
Since parties have the support of a vote bank that is less than half the population, they re-
quire support from the non-partisan electorate. Parties A and B need a minimum vote share
of (0.5 − nm) and (0.5 − nh) respectively in order to win the elections. They compete for
the support of non-partisans by promising a public good, given by the pair (TA3 , T
B
3 ). From
Equation 1 and Equation 2, a voter i ∈ G3 votes for A if,
µ+ ei ≤
(
TA3
n3
− T
B
3
n3
)
+ (vA3 − vB3 ) (8)
Definition 1. 1. Let ex ante polarization in identity trigger between parties be ∆θ = (θB − θA).
2. Let ηi = θiδq(2− q), where i ∈ {A, B}.
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The win probability of the parties given a pair of platforms (T1, TA3 ) and (T2, T
B
3 ) is,
pA =
1
n3
[
n1 + n3 − 12
]
+
1
n3
Φ(T1, TA3 , T
B
3 )
pB =
1
n3
[
n2 + n3 − 12
]
− 1
n3
Φ(T1, TA3 , T
B
3 )
where Φ(T1, TA3 , T
B
3 ) =
[
(TA3 − TB3 ) +
(
n3
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
)
(θAT1 − ∆θY1)
]
The payoff to a non-partisan voter from electing A is dependent on the net conflict payoff,
given by [θAT1 − ∆θY1]. When this term is positive, the voters get a net surplus from electing
A. As ∆θ increases, the gains from electing A is diminished. A higher transfer T1 increases the
expected returns from conflict to the majority identity if A wins, thereby providing an indirect
benefit via the identity conflict channel. The choice of public goods (TA3 , T
B
3 ) provides a direct
payoff to non-partisans. Party A influences voters through both direct and indirect channels
while B has only the direct channel. The platform selection stage involves a bargaining process
with vote banks and a public goods platform targeting the non-partisan voters.
Bargaining Outcomes
A and G1: The bargaining problem can be defined along the lines of Nash’s axiomatic
theory. Specifically, the outcome of the bargaining process is equivalent to maximizing the
Nash product. For the minority identity group G1, the payoff from A holding office is given
by Equation 5 and the outside option payoff is given by Equation 6. For A the surplus is
merely the political rents from holding office, (T − T1).
max
T1
n1[vA1 − vB1 ].[T − T1] subject to vA1 ≥ vB1 , T1 ≤ T
B and G2: For the G2 group the payoff from B holding office is given by Equation 4 and the
outside option payoff is given by Equation 3. For party B, the surplus from holding office is
(T − T2). The bargaining problem is therefore,
max
T2
n2[vB2 − vA2 ].[T − T2] subject to vB2 ≥ vA2 , T2 ≤ T
Platform Competition
The platform choice of the parties targeting non-partisan voters solves,
max
TA3
ΠA = pA.
[
T − T1 − TA3
]
subject to T1 + TA3 ≤ T, TA3 ≥ 0
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max
TB3
ΠB = pB.
[
T − T2 − TB3
]
subject to T2 + TB3 ≤ T, TB3 ≥ 0
The equilibrium platforms depend crucially on the size of each party’s vote bank (n1, n2),
the available benefits from political office T, income of the minority identity vote bank Y1,
polarization ∆θ, and the redistribution probability q.
Proposition 1. The unique equilibrium platforms, (T∗1 , T
A∗
3 ) and (T
∗
2 , T
B∗
3 ) is given by,
T∗1 =
T
2
− δq(2− q)
2(1− ηA) (∆θY1)
T∗2 =
T
2
−
(
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
4
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
TA
∗
3 =
T
2
+
1
3
(
δq(2− q)
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− 13
(
2n3 + n1 − 12
)
+
1
6
(
1+
n3
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
2
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
TB
∗
3 =
T
2
+
1
6
(
δq(2− q)
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− 13
(
2n3 + n2 − 12
)
− 1
6
(
n3 − n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
) [(2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
The equilibrium platforms are dependent on the conflict payoff differential between the
two parties. When this is positive, it implies that there is a net surplus to the majority identity
groups if party A wins. This affects the platform of party B. Specifically, the bargaining rent
T∗2 increases and so does the public goods promised by B to non-partisans. However a net
surplus implies party A offers lesser to the non-partisan voters and diverts more resources to
their vote bank.
Polarization and Rent Seeking
Since the net conflict payoff critically depends on polarization in identity formation under the
two parties, an increase in polarization affects ex-post income of both identity groups. This
has an effect on the ex-ante bargaining process.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium transfers to vote banks is decreasing in polarization. In other words,
political rents to the parties is increasing in ∆θ.
When the right-wing party is perceived to be more harmful to the minorities (higher polar-
ization), both parties capture a greater share of the bargaining surplus. The intuition is that
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as ∆θ increases, the net payoff to the minorities when party B wins elections decreases. As a
consequence, they are willing to accept a smaller share of surplus T in return for “protection”
from party A. This also increases in expectation the conflict rents to G2 if party B wins. Since
transfers offered by A to G1 decreases in equilibrium, the expected conflict rents to G2 if A
wins decreases as well. This decreases their bargaining power and reduces their transfers in
equilibrium.
Identity triggers and Rent-seeking. In the absence of polarization both vote bank groups
get an equal share of the surplus from office, i.e., T∗1 = T
∗
2 =
T
2 . An increase in polarization
creates an additional rent to both parties. The minorities implicitly seek protection from
increased inter-group conflict under B by accepting a transfer less than T2 . Further, the majority
vote bank accepts a smaller surplus from bargaining in return for (relatively) higher identity
conflict payoff under party B.22
Polarization and Public Good Provision
Corollary 2. The equilibrium platform choices (TA
∗
3 , T
B∗
3 ) are such that,
1. TA
∗
3 is increasing in ∆θ
2. TB
∗
3 is decreasing in ∆θ if either,
(a) 1+ TY1 > χ¯(θA, θB, K)
(b) θA < γ¯(K)
For party A the platform choices are strategic substitutes.23 This implies that whenever
transfers to the minority vote bank decreases, party A provides more public goods. For party
B, T2 and TB3 are strategic substitutes. However, there is an additional effect driven by the
indirect identity conflict channel, that is in turn dependent on T1. Notice that both T2 and
TB3 are increasing in conflict payoff due to an increase in T1. Therefore, on the one hand, an
increase in T1, in equilibrium, increases T2 and puts downward pressure on TB3 . On the other
hand, an increase in T1 also affects TB3 positively via the indirect channel. As a consequence
22In India, for example, the center-left Congress party has long been associated with playing poli-
tics of “Muslim appeasement” (see, e.g. Varshney (2003)). In the US context, the mechanism we
propose predicts that if polarization between the parties is greater, the rents promised to Blacks by
Democratic party, and to right-wing extremists supporting the Republican party, would both decrease.
See The Economist article on 7th March, 2019, https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/03/07/
african-americans-are-the-democrats-most-loyal-constituency, for more on this point.
23We can compute the second derivative of the expected payoff for A with respect to T1 and TA3 to see this
point clearly. Specifically,
d2ΠA
dT1dTA3
= − 1
n3
(
n3
n2 + n3
θAδq2 + 1) < 0
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the precise relationship between polarization and TB3 is determined by the size of these two
opposing forces.24
Interestingly, when minority incomes are low, the public goods promised by B increases.
The intuition is that when minorities are poor, the additional identity conflict payoff from
electing A is higher than the net payoff if party B is elected. This incentivizes B to offer
higher levels of public goods to the non-partisans. On a similar vein, when the size of B’s vote
bank (n2) decreases, non-partisans get an increased share of the conflict payoff. Identity rents
therefore substitute for public goods provision in equilibrium.25
Corollary 2 argues that greater ex-ante polarization can result in an increase of public
goods provision. This finding is different from that of Bardhan et al. (2018), who show that
public goods provision goes down for all parties due to the pressures of clientelism.
Institutional Bias and Platform Selection
Corollary 3. When the institutional bias K increases,
1. Party A’s platform is such that: T∗1 decreases and T
A∗
3 increases.
2. Party B’s platforms is such that:
• dT∗2dK < 0
• dTB
∗
3
dK > 0 if
T
Y1
>
¯
β(θA, θB, K)
An increase in K increases the expected losses from conflict for minorities. Ceteris paribus,
this increases the bargaining power of party A and reduce transfers in equilibrium. Since
T∗1 and T
A∗
3 are strategic substitutes, a decrease in T1 frees up resources for A which then
promises more public goods to non-partisans.
The case of party B is more nuanced because of the direct and indirect channels. When
the minority group income is very low, the expected conflict payoff to the majority identity
voters is negligible if party B wins. This increases the bargaining power of B’s vote bank (via
the direct channel) but reduces the incentive of non-partisans to vote for B. As a consequence
both T∗2 and TB
∗
3 are increasing in K.
26
24The second derivatives of the expected payoff for B are,
d2ΠB
dT2dTB3
= − 1
n3
< 0
d2ΠB
dT1dTB3
=
1
n2 + n3
θAδq2 > 0
25A similar intuition goes through in condition (b). When n2 decreases, γ¯(.) becomes larger and more of
the conflict surplus accrues to non-partisan voters. This in turn reduces the public good provision by B in
equilibrium.
26An opposite effect is at play when the minority incomes are very high. In this case, the bargaining power of
B increases with respect to G2. At the same time, non-partisan voters also gain from additional identity conflict
payoff due to a higher K. This results in both a lower T∗2 and TB
∗
3 .
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T
Y1
T∗2 TB
∗
3
<
¯
β ↓ ↓
>
¯
β ↓ ↑
4 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis focuses on political competition and institutional bias in India, and
how they determine Hindu-Muslim conflict and provisioning of public goods. India is a
suitable laboratory for our analysis, since religious cleavages have shaped its electoral pol-
itics since independence.27 The main right-wing party, the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) has
cultivated upper caste Hindus as its traditional voter base. The main left leaning party, the
Indian National Congress (INC) has cultivated minority Muslims as its voter base. Since inde-
pendence India has experienced about 40,000 deaths or injuries in Hindu-Muslim riots, that
have disproportionately affected the Muslim minorities (Varshney, 2004; Mitra and Ray, 2014).
Consequently, Muslim voters regard physical security as a key governance issue compared to
their Hindu counterparts (Wilkinson, 2006). Further, there is a general perception that Mus-
lims face higher threat from ethnic violence when BJP is in power.28 In the following sections
we explain how we construct the main variables and then present results from our regression
framework.
4.1 Data
We construct a geo-referenced district year panel dataset for 339 districts for the period from
1983 till 2000. In this section we provide information about the main datasets and variables
that we use to enable the empirical analysis.
Riots.—The original dataset on riots from 1950 to 1995 is by Varshney and Wilkinson (1995).
The dataset was collected using individual newspaper reports on riots from the Mumbai
edition of The Times of India. This is further extended up to 2001 by Iyer and Shrivastava
(2018). Using information on riot location, Iyer and Shrivastava (2018) matched each riot to
339 districts, that are defined as per the Election Commission of India’s delimitation order
released in 1976. These districts serve as the spatial unit for our empirical exercise. We further
geo-locate the center for each district using a GIS software. The matched riots are spread
across sixteen large states, that accounted for 96% of Indian population at the end of our
sample period (Iyer and Shrivastava, 2018).
27From early 1980’s onwards, a Hindu nationalist identity has been at the forefront in Indian politics (Jaffrelot,
2009).
28“Why India’s Muslims Are in Grave Danger”, Foreign Policy (March 2, 2020).
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Party Rule.—Our main political variable of interest is the party in power in a given year.
We focus on party rule at the state level than at the national level for three reasons. First,
only six national elections were held during our sample period. Thus, it would be difficult to
separate the effect of election outcomes from coterminous national trends (Iyer and Shrivas-
tava, 2018). Second, each state has its own social configuration that determines how political
parties cultivate and bargain with their vote banks (Chhibber, 1995). Third, the party in power
at the state level is responsible for enforcing law and order. Thus, the difference in party rule
across states can have important consequences for controlling riots (Wilkinson, 2009). Data on
party in power at the state level comes from Ticku (2015).
Household Expenditure, Public Goods and Demographics.—We collect household level expen-
diture data from large-scale household surveys (NSS) that are conducted every five years. We
gather data from four survey rounds that were conducted during our sample period. The first
survey round was conducted in 1983, the second round in 1987-88, the third round in 1993-94
and the final round in 1999-00. These surveys list the religious identity of each household.
This enables us to calculate household expenditure (per capita) by religion.
The first and the final survey rounds do not permit identification of the households at the
district level. Instead we can calculate the household expenditures at regional level, which is
an intermediate spatial unit between the district and the state. There are 60 regions that we
can match to the 339 districts in our sample. For each district we assign the household ex-
penditure of its corresponding region for a given survey round year. The non-round years are
calculated from a linear interpolation between two consecutive rounds. In addition to house-
hold expenditure we also collect information to construct controls for overall expenditure,
population and religious polarization, in the spirit of Mitra and Ray (2014).
The district-wise distribution of public goods such as share of houses electrified (%) and
other demographics such as Muslim population share and literacy rate is obtained from cen-
sus data, starting from 1981 until 2001 (three rounds in total). The value of variables in
non-census years is obtained by linearly interpolating between two census years. We source
this data from Iyer and Shrivastava (2018).
Institutional bias.—We do not have a direct measure of institutional bias against minorities.
Instead, we use the distance of a district to its nearest medieval port location as a proxy for
institutional bias against Muslims. This is based on evidence that medieval port locations
continue to enjoy higher inter-ethnic complementarity between Hindus and Muslims, due to
local institutions that developed as a result of economic conditions in the medieval period
(Jha, 2013). Medieval ports data is sourced from Jha (2013). Using GIS software we calculate
the distance of a district’s centroid to the nearest medieval port location. In our sample, 10% of
all districts are within 100 kilometers of a medieval port location. Table 1 provides summary
statistics for the main variables.
17
4.2 Regression Estimation
4.2.1 Party Rule and Conflict Investment
We first investigate the relationship between party rule and riot outcomes. Specifically, we
are interested in how Congress rule can affect the intensity of Hindu Muslim riots. Our
theoretical model predicts that majority Hindus have a higher incentive to invest in conflict
under Congress rule, due to the size of potential gains from conflict redistribution. Therefore,
riots should be more intense when Congress is in power.
Our regression model assumes the following form:
Riotist = α+ β1 INCRuleist + γ
′
Xist + FEi + FEt + eist (9)
The dependent variable measures riot at both extensive and intensive margin. Our first
measure is a dummy that equals 1 if at least one Hindu-Muslim riot occurred in district i in
year t. Next, we measure riot intensity with the number of days of rioting that took place in
district i in year t. We assume that duration of riots is in proportion to investment in conflict.
Our main explanatory variable is a dummy that equals 1 if district i was in state s that
was ruled by the Congress party (INC) in year t. We include a battery of control variables in
vector Xist that are used elsewhere in the riot literature (Mitra and Ray, 2014). Specifically,
we control for per capita expenditure, urbanization, population, Muslim population share and
religious polarization in district i in year t. FEi accounts for any unobserved differences across
districts that are time invariant. FEt accounts for shocks that are common across time. β1 is
the coefficient of interest and measures the difference in riot outcomes between Congress and
non-Congress ruled districts.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level since the level of treatment (party rule)
varies across states. This creates a unique problem due to the small number of clusters in our
data (s=16). A failure to correct for small number of clusters can lead to over rejecting the
null hypothesis (Cameron et al., 2008). We address this concern by using wild bootstrapped
clustered standard errors as suggested by Cameron et al. (2008).29
Table 2 shows the effect of Congress rule on riot outcomes. Columns (1) and (2) sug-
gest that riots are no less likely to break out in a Congress ruled district. Columns (3)
and (4) however suggest that conditional on a riot incidence, the effect is more intense in
a Congress ruled district. The effect is statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficient sug-
gests that a Congress ruled district experiences 0.14 additional days of rioting compared to
a non-Congress ruled district. The magnitude of β1 is also economically significant since the
average duration of riots in our sample is equal to 0.24 days. In Column (5) we present a count
model with full set of controls, as well as district and year fixed effects and estimate it using
29We implement wild bootstrapped clustering in STATA using a program written by Fisman et al. (2014).
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Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimation (PPML). Such a specification alleviates the
concern that our dependent variable is overdispersed (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The effect of
Congress rule on riot duration is once again positive and statistically significant.
On a related point, we have assumed that Congress rule is exogenous to riot outcomes. The
literature on Hindu-Muslim riots and electoral outcomes in India shows that riot events can
hurt Congress party’s electoral prospects (Ticku, 2015; Nellis et al., 2016; Iyer and Shrivastava,
2018). The problem of reverse causality is mitigated to an extent, as our main explanatory
variable varies at a higher dimension than the dependent variable. It is still plausible that
large riots in a district severely hamper Congress party’s electoral performance in ensuing
state elections. In that case the estimated effect of Congress rule on riot intensity reported
here may underestimate the true effect.
We further check the mechanism that underlie the relationship between Congress rule
and riot intensity. If size of potential redistribution from conflict is the underlying channel,
then riot intensity under Congress rule should be magnified by the economic resources that
Muslims possess. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 we interact Congress rule with Muslim per
capita expenditure. Results suggest that riot duration in Congress ruled districts is magnified
by Muslim expenditure. The coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant at
1% level in Column (2). The point estimate in Column (2) implies that if Muslim per capita
expenditure rose from 25th percentile of the sample to its 75th percentile, riot duration under
Congress rule will increase by 78%.
Finally, in Columns (3) and (4) we assess whether institutional bias against Muslims weak-
ens conflict investment by the majority group. The intuition is that institutional bias increases
the marginal cost of defense for Muslims, leading to lower investment from both groups.30
We interact our main interaction (INC Rule × Muslim expenditure) with our proxy of insti-
tutional bias, that is the distance of district i from the nearest medieval port. We hypothesize
that districts that are further away from medieval port locations possess lower long-term inter-
ethnic complementarity between Hindus and Muslims that arose due to medieval trade (Jha,
2013). Therefore, distance to medieval port should dampen the investment in conflict. While
the coefficient of the triple interaction is negative in Columns (3) and (4), the effect is impre-
cisely estimated. We do not find robust evidence of institutional bias weakening investment
in conflict. In Columns (5) and (6) we present the results from pseudo maximum likelihood
estimation, that are in line with OLS results obtained in Columns (2) and (4).
30Muslims investment in conflict reduces with increase in cost of defense. Strategic complementarity implies
that Hindus also reduce the attack investment.
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4.2.2 Party Rule, Institutional Bias and Provisioning of Public Goods
Next we assess the relationship between party rule, institutional bias and provisioning of
public goods. Our theory predicts that institutional bias can weaken the bargaining power of
Muslim voters with respect to the Congress party. It incentives the Congress party to promise
greater public goods to the non-partisan voters. Hence provisioning of public goods under
Congress rule is increasing in institutional bias against Muslims.
The effect of institutional bias on provisioning of public goods under BJP’s rule is more
complex. Higher institutional bias amplifies the possibility of redistribution from conflict
under BJP rule. The non-partisan voters also benefit from the higher chance of conflict re-
distribution under BJP rule. This can strengthen the bargaining power of BJP with respect to
the non-partisans. However, the probable transfers to non-partisans under Congress rule also
increases with institutional bias. This indirect effect weakens BJP’s bargaining power with
respect to the non-partisans. The empirical puzzle is which of two effects dominate?
We estimate the relationship between party rule, institutional bias and provisioning of
public goods from the following specification:
Electricityist = α+ β1PartyRuleist + β2Biasi + β3(PartyRuleist× Biasi)+γ′Xist +FEi +FEt + eist
(10)
We use the share of houses electrified in district i in year t as the outcome of interest. The
main explanatory variable is the interaction between district i’s distance to the nearest me-
dieval port and the party in power in that district in year t. β3 is the coefficient of interest and
measures how provisioning of electricity under either party’s rule changes with institutional
bias.
Table 4 shows how institutional bias affects provision of electricity under Congress rule.
Columns (1) and (2) show that β1 is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The mag-
nitude implies that provisioning of electricity is higher by 1.4% in a Congress ruled district.
Columns (3) and (4) report our coefficient of interest, β3, is positive and statistically significant
at 1% level. The point estimate implies that there is a higher provisioning of electricity under
Congress rule as the institutional bias against Muslims rise.
Table 5 shows how institutional bias affects provision of electricity under BJP rule. Columns
(1) and (2) show that on average there is no difference in provision of electricity under BJP
rule. In Columns (3) and (4) the coefficient of β3 is negative and statistically significant at
5% level. This result suggests that the the bargaining between BJP and non-partisan voters is
primarily driven by the possibility of conflict redistribution under BJP’s rule.
Finally, we empirically assess the condition, according to our theoretical model, under
which one of the two channels unambiguously determine the bargaining between BJP and the
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non-partisans. Such a condition is satisfied when Muslim income is low enough that gains
from conflict redistribution under BJP rule is comparatively less attractive to the non-partisans
than a potential transfer from the Congress party. This incentivizes BJP to offer more public
goods. We assess this prediction in Columns (5) and (6) where we interact our main interaction
(BJP Rule × Institutional Bias) with a dummy that equals 1 if Muslim per capita expenditure
in district i in year t is in the bottom quarter of its respective state’s (s) distribution. The triple
interaction is positive in both columns and statistically significant at 1% level in Column (6).
This result supports our model’s prediction that BJP offers higher public goods only when
their potential gain from conflict redistribution is negligible.
5 Conclusion
We study political competition between two parties in the presence of group identity and
ex-post inter group conflict. Parties have the support of a vote bank and seek votes from
non-partisans in the electorate. There is ex-post conflict between the majority and minority
groups, driven by an identity trigger. The trigger is relatively higher under one party inducing
ex-ante polarization between the parties. Further, minorities face an institutional bias when
conflict happens.
We characterize optimal levels of clientelism by parties towards their vote bank groups.
We find the emergence of protection rents and identity rents. The size of these rents to par-
ties increases in the extent of polarization and institutional biases. We show that public good
provision by parties varies as a consequence of ex-ante polarization. The party with minority
vote bank support increases provision of public goods when the polarization increases. The
majority vote bank party increases provision only when minority incomes are below a thresh-
old. Therefore, we find that public goods provision is higher in societies where minorities are
very poor.
We investigate how group identity and institutional bias determine conflict and provision
of public goods in India. Results show that conflict is more intense when the party with
minority vote bank is in power. Furthermore, the effect gets magnified with the economic
resources possessed by minorities. The relationship between institutional bias and provision
of public goods is also dependent on the party in power. There is an increase in provision of
public goods under party with minority vote bank, and this effect increases with institutional
bias. A similar effect is observed under the party with majority vote bank, when minority
incomes are below a threshold. This suggests that parties compete more intensely over public
goods provision when the channel for identity politics is weak. Our results highlight a rent
seeking opportunity for political parties due to widening identity fault lines.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES N Mean SD 25th 50th 75th Min Max
INC Rule 6102 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 0 1
BJP Rule 6102 0.15 0.36 0 0 1 0 1
Riot 6102 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1
Riot duration (days) 6102 0.24 1.90 0 0 0 0 75
Electricity (%) 6102 41.61 23.85 21.44 39.38 60.46 2.61 97.06
Muslim (%) 6022 11.95 13.99 4.12 8.75 13.60 0.11 98.06
Urban (%) 6022 22.22 15.33 11.50 18.79 27.65 2.88 100.00
Literacy (%) 6022 42.54 13.68 32.13 41.27 51.46 11.83 85.36
Log Muslim per capita expenditure 6102 9.28 1.11 9.05 9.70 10.00 6.40 10.38
Log per capita expenditure 6102 9.32 1.12 9.09 9.73 10.04 6.41 10.44
Religious polarization 6102 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34
Log population 6102 0.47 0.00 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.48
Distance to medieval port (km) 6102 613.42 377.19 277.50 637.07 923.62 1.63 1616.97
Table 2: Congress Rule and Hindu Muslim Riots
OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Riot Riot Duration Duration Duration
INC Rule 0.00717 0.0115 0.143** 0.183** 0.425**
(0.0111) (0.00773) (0.0688) (0.0734) (0.172)
Observations 6,004 6,004 6,004 6,004 3,082
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies N Y N Y Y
Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the state level are given in
parentheses (Cameron et al., 2008). In Columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if
atleast one riot occured in district (i) in year (t). In Columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the number
of days of rioting in district (i) in year (t). INC Rule is a dummy that equals 1 if district (i) was ruled by the
Congress party in year (t). We include controls for literacy rate, urbanization, per capita expenditure, population,
Muslim population share and religious polarization in all specifications. In Column (5) we use Poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood maximum likelihood estimation (PPML). Standard errors clustered at the state level are
given in the parantheses.
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Table 4: Congress Rule, Institutional Bias and Public Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Electricity Electricity Electricity Electricity
INC Rule 1.382*** 1.638*** -8.190*** -9.241***
(0.518) (0.572) (2.253) (2.559)
Institutional Bias
INC Rule × Institutional Bias 1.606*** 1.833***
(0.414) (0.480)
Observations 6,004 6,004 6,004 6,004
Controls Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies N Y N Y
Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the state level are given in
parentheses (Cameron et al., 2008). The dependent variable is the share of houses electrified in district (i) in
year (t). INC Rule is a dummy that equals 1 if district (i) was ruled by the Congress party in year (t). We
include controls for literacy rate, urbanization, per capita expenditure, population, Muslim population share
and religious polarization in all specifications. Institutional bias is the log distance of district i’s centroid from
the nearest medieval port location.
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Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
The problem faced by the majority group when either party is in power is given by,
aj23 ≡ argmax
aj23
(
(1− n1)aj23
n1.a
j
1 + (1− n1).aj23
)(
δY j1
n2 + n3
)
− aj23 (11)
The corresponding problem for a minority group individual is,
aj1 ≡ argmax
aj1
−
(
(1− n1)aj23
n1.a
j
1 + (1− n1).aj23
)(
δY j1
n1
)
− Kaj1 (12)
The first term of Equation 11 is the per capita expected returns from conflict for a citizen
belonging to the majority. The first term of Equation 12 is the per capita expected loss to
the minority voter in G1. Since the conflict problem is symmetric to both the majority and
minority members, we index the investment according to the party in power. Solving the
maximization problem yields the following FOC:
n1.a
j
1(
n1.a
j
1 + (1− n1).aj23
)2 .(δY j1) = 1
(1− n1).aj23(
n1.a
j
1 + (1− n1).aj23
)2 .(δY j1) = K
The solution to the two equations gives the required result conflict investments by the two
sides in equilibrium,
aj1 =
1
(1+ K)2
(
δY j1
n1
)
aj23 =
K
(1+ K)2
.
(
δY j1
1− n1
)
The probability of redistribution is computed as,
q =
(1− n1)aj23
n1.a
j
1 + (1− n1).aj23
=
K
1+ K
This completes the proof. QED
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Proof of Proposition 1
Bargaining equilibrium
The bargaining problem of G1 and party A is,
max
T1
[vA1 − vB1 ].[T − T1] subject to vA1 ≥ vB1 , T1 ≤ T
The difference in conflict loss for the minority group between the two parties is,
vA1 − vB1 =
T1
n1
− qδ
n1
(θAT1 − ∆θY1)− K
(
θAaA1 − θBaB1
)
(θAaA1 − θBaB1 ) =
q
n1(1+ K)2
(θAT1 − ∆θY1)
Rewriting K
(1+K)2 = q(1− q) and simplifying yields,
n1(vA1 − vB1 ) = T1 − δq(2− q)[θAT1 − ∆θY1]
Rearranging,
n1(vA1 − vB1 ) = [1− ηA]T1 + δq(2− q)(∆θY1)
The maximization condition with respect to T1 is therefore,
[1− ηA](T − T1) = n1(vA1 − vB1 )
Solving yields,
T∗1 =
T
2
− δq(2− q)
2(1− ηA) (∆θY1) (13)
Similarly, the bargaining problem between G2 and party B is,
max
T2
n2[vB2 − vA2 ].[T − T2] subject to vB2 ≥ vA2 , T2 ≤ T
The total surplus for group G2 voters is,
n2[vB2 − vA2 ] = T2 −
n2
n2 + n3
δq2(θAT1 − ∆θY1)
The foc is,
(T − T2) = T2 − n2n2 + n3 δq
2(θAT1 − ∆θY1) (14)
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Substituting for T1 from Equation 13, we get the desired expression,
T∗2 =
T
2
−
(
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
4
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
(15)
Voting Outcome
The vote share of each party given a pair of platforms (TA3 , T
B
3 ) is computed using Equation 8,
µ+ ei ≤
(
TA3
n3
− T
B
3
n3
)
+ (vA3 − vB3 )
The difference (vA3 − vB3 ) is given by,
(vA3 − vB3 ) =
δq2
(n2 + n3)
(θLT1 − ∆θY1)
Rewriting the above equation,
µ+ ei ≤ 1n3
[
(TA3 − TB3 ) +
n3
(n2 + n3)
δq2(θAT1 − ∆θY1)
]
≡ 1
n3
Φ(T1, TA3 , T
B
3 )
The vote share of party A is,
sA = n3.Pr
[
ei ≤ 1n3Φ(T1, T
A
3 , T
B
3 )− µ
]
= n3.
[
1
2
+
1
n3
Φ(T1, TA3 , T
B
3 )− µ
]
The win probability of party A is,
pA = Pr[sA ≥ (0.5− n1)]
pA =
1
n3
[
(n1 + n3 − 0.5) +Φ(T1, TA3 , TB3 )
]
Analogously, the win probability of party B is,
pB =
1
n3
[
(n2 + n3 − 0.5)−Φ(T1, TA3 , TB3 )
]
Non-Partisan Platform Equilibrium
The platform choice TA3 solves,
max
TA3
ΠA = pA.
[
T − T1 − TA3
]
subject to T1 + TA3 ≤ T, TA3 ≥ 0
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The Lagrangian for the optimization problem is,
L = 1
n3
[
(n1 + n3 − 0.5) +Φ(T1, TA3 , TB3 )
]
[T − T1 − TA3 ] +ΛA[T − T1 − TA3 ] + λATA3 (16)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are,
∂L
∂TA3
=
1
n3
[T − T1 − TA3 ]−
1
n3
[
(n1 + n3 − 0.5) +Φ(T1, TA3 , TB3 )
]
−ΛA + λA = 0
T1 + TA3 = T or ΛA = 0
TA3 = 0 or λA = 0
The latter two are the complementary slackness conditions. We proceed to show that to
guarantee a maximum, it must be that ΛA = 0 and T1 + TA3 < T, and, λA = 0 and T
A
3 > 0.
We show this by contradiction.
Case 1. Suppose ΛA > 0.
In this case, complementary slackness constraint implies T1 + TA3 = T and the payoff to
party A is 0. Clearly, given the continuity of the win-probability pA, a small decrease in TA3
such that T˜3A = T − T1 − ε l where ε l ↓ 0 decreases pA but the expected payoff is greater than
zero. That is,
d[pA.(T − T1 − TA3 )]
dTA3
∣∣∣∣∣
TA3 =(T−T1)
= −pA < 0
Therefore in equilibrium, it cannot be that TA3 = (T − T1). By complementary slackness, it
must be that ΛA = 0, a contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose λA > 0.
In this case, TA3 = 0 implies,
d[pA.(T − T1 − TA3 )]
dTA3
∣∣∣∣∣
TA3 =0
=
1
n3
[T − T1]− 1n3
[
(n1 + n3 − 0.5) +Φ(T1, 0, TB3 )
]
Φ(T1, 0, TB3 ) = −TB3 −
n3
(n2 + n3)
δq2(∆θY1 − θAT1)
Φ(T1, 0, TB3 ) = −
[
TB3 + δq
2(∆θY1 − θAT1)− n2(n2 + n3)δq
2(∆θY1 − θAT1)
]
From Equation 14, we substitute n2
(n2+n3)
δq2(∆θY1 − θAT1) = T − 2T2
Φ(T1, 0, TB3 ) = −
[
TB3 + δq
2(∆θY1 − θAT1)− (T − 2T2)
]
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d[pA.(T − T1 − TA3 )]
dTA3
∣∣∣∣∣
TA3 =0
=
1
n3
[
T − T1 − (n1 + n3 − 0.5) + TB3 + δq2(∆θY1 − θAT1)− (T − 2T2)
]
d[pA.(T − T1 − TA3 )]
dTA3
∣∣∣∣∣
TA3 =0
=
1
n3
[
2T2 − T1 − (n1 + n3 − 0.5) + TB3 + δq2(∆θY1 − θAT1)
]
Where,
2T2 − T1 = T2 +
ηA
2(1− ηA)
∆θY1
θA
−
(
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
2
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
Further,
δq2(∆θY1 − θAT1) =
(
δq2
2
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
Substituting the above simplifications back into the foc of the expected payoff,
d[pA.(T − T1 − TA3 )]
dTA3
∣∣∣∣∣
TA3 =0
> 0 if
[
T
2
+
(
ηA
2(1− ηA)
)(
∆θY1
θA
)
+
(
n3
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
2
)((
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
)
+ TB3
]
>
(n1 + n3 − 0.5)
The above inequality always holds strictly since our assumptions imply that the win-
probabilities are well defined and such that pi ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, this implies that not
providing any additional transfers to the non-partisans cannot be optimal. It follows that
TA3 > 0 =⇒ λA = 0, a contradiction.
Finally, we check for the second order condition to ensure that there is an unique maximum
when TA3 ∈ (0, T − T1).
d2[pA.(T − T1 − TA3 )]
dTA23
∣∣∣∣∣
TA3 ∈(0,T−T1)
= − 2
n3
The maximization problem is analogous to party B. Specifically,
L = 1
n3
[
(n2 + n3 − 0.5)−Φ(T1, TA3 , TB3 )
]
[T − T2 − TB3 ] +ΛB[T − T2 − TB3 ] + λBTB3 (17)
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are,
∂L
∂TB3
=
1
n3
[T − T2 − TB3 ]−
1
n3
[
(n2 + n3 − 0.5)−Φ(T1, TA3 , TB3 )
]
−ΛB + λB = 0
T2 + TB3 = T or ΛB = 0
TB3 = 0 or λB = 0
A similar set of arguments hold in the case of party B and therefore will not be presented. We
now proceed to solve for the unique non-partisan equilibrium platform.
The foc’s for an interior solution for party A is,
(n1 + n3 − 0.5) + (TA3 − TB3 )−
n3
(n2 + n3)
δq2(∆θY1 − θAT1) = (T − T1 − TA3 )
Substituting for (∆θY1 − θAT1),
(n1 + n3 − 0.5) + (TA3 − TB3 )−
n3
(n2 + n3)
(
δq2
2
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
= (T − T1 − TA3 )
And, analogously, for party B is,
(n2 + n3 − 0.5) + (TB3 − TA3 ) +
n3
(n2 + n3)
(
δq2
2
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
= (T − T2 − TB3 )
Substituting for (T1, T2) and solving yields the required solutions:
TA
∗
3 =
T
2
+
1
3
(
δq(2− q)
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− 13
(
2n3 + n1 − 12
)
+
1
6
(
1+
n3
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
2
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
(18)
TB
∗
3 =
T
2
+
1
6
(
δq(2− q)
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− 13
(
2n3 + n2 − 12
)
− 1
6
(
n3 − n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
) [(2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
(19)
Together, Equation 13, Equation 15, Equation 18, and Equation 19 define the unique equi-
librium platform of the parties. QED
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Proof of Corollaries 1, 2, and 3
The increase in polarization can be due to a decrease in θA or an increase in θB. We consider
both possibilities.
dT∗1
dθA
=
(
ηA
2θA
)(
1− ηB
(1− ηA)2
)
Y1 > 0
dT∗1
dθB
= −
(
η2B
2θ2B(1− ηA)
)
Y1 < 0
dT∗2
dθA
=
(
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
4
) [
T +
(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
Y1 − (ηB − ηA)(1− ηA)2 Y1
]
Simplifying yields,
dT∗2
dθA
=
(
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
4
) [
T +Y1 +
(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2 Y1
]
> 0
dT∗2
dθB
= −
(
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
4
)(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
Y1 < 0
The above expressions imply that both T∗1 and T
∗
2 decreases when polarization increases. As
a result the political rents to the parties, (T − T∗1 ) and (T − T∗2 ) both increase. This proves
Corollary 1.
dTA
∗
3
dθA
= − ηA
3θA
(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2 Y1 −
(
1+
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
12
) [
T +Y1 +
(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2 Y1
]
< 0
dTA
∗
3
dθB
=
ηA
3θA(1− ηA)Y1 +
(
1+
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
3
)(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
Y1 > 0
This proves the first part of Corollary 2. We continue with the same exercise for TB
∗
3 .
dTB
∗
3
dθA
= −
(
ηA(1− ηB)
6θA(1− ηA)2
)
Y1 +
δq2(n3 − n2)
6(n2 + n3)
[
T +Y1 +
(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2 Y1
]
=⇒ dT
B∗
3
dθA
> 0 if
q(n3 − n2)
(n2 + n3)
[
T +Y1 +
(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2 Y1
]
>
(2− q)(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2 Y1
T >
[(
(n2 + n3)(2− q)(1− ηB)
(n3 − n2)q(1− ηA)2
)
−
(
1+
(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2
)]
Y1
=⇒ 1+ T
Y1
>
(1− ηB)
(1− ηA)2
[
(n2 + n3)(2− q)− (n3 − n2)q
(n3 − n2)q
]
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Substituting for q = K1+K , and using the definition of population shares r23 =
n2
n3
, and simpli-
fying the above yields,
1+
T
Y1
>
2 (1+ (1− θBδ)K)
(1+ (1− θAδ)K)
(1+ K) (1+ r23(1+ K))
K(1− r23) ≡ χ¯(θA, θB, K, r23)
dTB
∗
3
dθB
=
δq
6(1− ηA)
[
(2− q)− q(2− ηA)
(
1− r23
1+ r23
)]
=⇒ dT
B∗
3
dθB
< 0 if
2+ K
K
< (2− ηA)
(
1− r23
1+ r23
)
Simplifying the inequality yields the required expression:
dTB
∗
3
dθB
< 0 =⇒ θA <
(
(1+ K)2
δK(2+ K)
)(
2− 2+ K
K
1+ r23
1− r23
)
≡ γ¯(K, r23)
This completes the proof of Corollary 2.
T∗1 is decreasing in ηA and ηA is increasing in q, implying
dT∗1
dq < 0.
TA
∗
3 =
T
2
+
1
3
(
ηA
θA(1− ηA)
)
(∆θY1)− 13
(
2n3 + n1 − 12
)
+
1
6
(
1+
n3
n2 + n3
)(
δq2
2
) [(
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
By similar reasoning, both the second and last terms in the above expression are increasing in
ηA. Therefore, TA
∗
3 is increasing in q. This completes first part of the Corollary.
dT∗2
dq
=
(
n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq
2
) [
−
((
2− ηA
1− ηA
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
)
−
(
δq(1− q)θA
(1− ηA)2
)
(∆θY1)
]
< 0
dTB∗3
dq
=
(
θAδ(1− q)
3(1− ηA)2
)(
∆θY1
θA
)
−
(
n3 − n2
n2 + n3
)(
δq
3
) [(
1+
1− ηAδq
(1− ηA)2
)
(∆θY1)− θAT
]
From simple algebraic manipulation, dT
B∗
3
dq > 0 if,
T
Y1
>
[(
1+
(1− θAδq)
(1− ηA)2
)
−
(
n2 + n3
n3 − n2
1− q
q
1
(1− ηA)2
)]
∆θ
θA
≡
¯
β(θA, θB, K)
This completes the proof. QED
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